Matching Markets & Mechanism Design
Allocation and matching systems shaped by incentives, strategic behavior, and market design.
PhD Candidate in Statistics & Data Science at UCLA
I develop statistical and market-design methods for scarce allocation systems, with current work on fairness in kidney exchange and preference signaling in the academic job market.
About
I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Statistics & Data Science at the University of California, Los Angeles and a member of the SCALE Lab. My research lies at the intersection of statistical market design, ranking and inference under uncertainty, and fairness in resource allocation.
I study allocation and matching problems where incentives, uncertainty, and fairness interact. Current applications include kidney exchange and the academic job market, alongside broader interests in mechanism design, matching markets, game theory, and statistical inference for high-stakes decisions.
Research
My research is at the intersection of matching markets, mechanism design, and statistical inference, including ranking under uncertainty.
Allocation and matching systems shaped by incentives, strategic behavior, and market design.
Statistical methods for learning, comparison, and ranking under uncertainty.
Publications
Teaching