Ali Kaazempur-Mofrad

PhD Candidate in Statistics & Data Science at UCLA

I develop statistical and market-design methods for scarce allocation systems, with current work on fairness in kidney exchange and preference signaling in the academic job market.

Department
Statistics & Data Science
University of California, Los Angeles
Portrait of Ali Kaazempur-Mofrad

Current focus

Fairness in resource allocation, statistical market design, ranking under uncertainty, and strategyproof mechanisms.

Profile

About

I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Statistics & Data Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. My research sits at the intersection of statistical inference and market design, with an emphasis on allocation problems where fairness, uncertainty, and strategic behavior all matter.

As a member of the SCALE Lab, I develop statistical methods and mechanism-design frameworks for resource allocation and matching. One line of work studies fairness in kidney exchange through multi-criteria efficiency evaluation and uncertainty-aware inference. Another develops structured preference signaling and confidence-calibrated interview ranking for the academic job market. I am also interested in extending these ideas to broader questions of truthful elicitation and strategyproof mechanism design.

Research

Current Research

My work develops statistical and market-design tools for allocation problems with scarce resources, latent preferences, and strategic behavior. Current applications span organ transplant allocation and congested academic labor markets.

Fairness in Resource Allocation

Studying fairness in scarce allocation systems such as kidney exchange using multi-criteria efficiency analysis and uncertainty-aware statistical evaluation.

Statistical Market Design

Designing mechanisms for congested two-sided markets, including structured preference signaling for academic hiring.

Ranking Under Uncertainty

Building confidence-calibrated ranking and inference procedures that support high-stakes selection decisions with statistical guarantees.

Strategyproof Mechanisms

Studying how incentive-compatible and truthful mechanisms can improve allocation, matching, and selection decisions in strategic environments.

Publications

Selected Work

Current work spans fairness evaluation in kidney exchange and statistical market design for congested academic hiring.

Teaching

Teaching Experience

I have supported undergraduate and graduate statistics courses across probability, regression, computation, consulting, and applied data analysis at UCLA.

Graduate Student Instructor

  • STATS 10: Introduction to Statistical Reasoning
  • STATS 13: Introduction to Statistical Methods for Life and Health Sciences
  • STATS 100B: Introduction to Mathematical Statistics
  • STATS 100C: Linear Models
  • STATS 101A: Introduction to Data Analysis and Regression
  • STATS 102A: Introduction to Computational Statistics with R
  • STATS 102C: Introduction to Monte Carlo Methods
  • STATS 140XP: Practice of Statistical Consulting
  • STATS 403: Mathematical Statistics

Reader / Grader

  • STATS 12: Introduction to Statistical Methods for Geography and Environmental Studies
  • STATS 13: Introduction to Statistical Methods for Life and Health Sciences
  • STATS 100B: Introduction to Mathematical Statistics